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Book Reviews 
Narmtive Discourse: An Essay in Metbod by Gerard Genette, translated by Jane 
E. Lewin, Forewor.d by Jonathan Culler. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1980. Pp, 285. $15.00. 
Jonathan Culler characterizes Gera.r:d Genette's Narrative Discourse as "one 
of the central achievements of what was called 'structuralism.'" That spoiler 
of a past tense and Gcnette's rather humble introduction and afterwOl~d reduce 
Narrative Discourse to a document of critical history rather than a viable theory, 
a flower of decay rather than a bud of new beginnings. The resulting pall cast over 
the book awakens the critic in one, despite the fact that tills study is onc of the 
most admirable available on its subject. IVleasured, insightful, self-conscious, 
generalizable-it has all the virtues that modern SCholarship esteems. VV1lat is 
it then that makes us stand back and reserve judgment lll1til the inevitable flaws 
show through? 
Genette sets out to analyze narrative discourse according to categories borrowed 
from the grammar of verbs: tense, mood, and voice. At the same time he 
chooses to illustrate his typology-or perhaps to rival it-with ,an analysis of 
Proust's A fa Recherche du temps perdu. His typologies are powerful enough 
to show up other theorists, who cill'onically confuse their O'Wll categories, wiule 
his analysis reveals the uniqueness of Proust's achievement as ra manipulation 
of the very narrative categories that Genette has isolated. Where other narratol-
ogists stop at the meta-level, Genette's theory pays off in his analysis, and the 
inexperienced reader is supplied with a guide to application that is both 
disciplined and inspired. Though I am no expert on Proust, I suspect that 
Proustian scholars will be much impressed with Genette's work, while narrative 
theorists will undoubtedly find it, as Culler does, "nhe most thorough attempt 
we have to identify, name, and iUustrate the basic constituents and techniques 
of narrative." 
Or will they? Beyond the author's rather cloying ardor for etymology, his 
conscientious coining of terminology which he almost immediately consigns to 
the garbage heap of history, and his ocqasional undecipherable "formulae" for 
narrative, the utility of nlus book is marred by ·two related problems. The 
fust is Genette's inability to recognize mimesis when he sees it; the second is his 
failure to include literary and ideological norms ·within his scheme. I suppose 
that these ,are what Culler means by the label of "structuralism" when he 
declares-again in the past tense-that it "sought not to interpret literature 
but to investigate its structures and devices." But the attempt at investigating 
structures ,and devices without spelling out the conditions for interpretation is 
surely wrong-headed, and in Genctte's case in particular, where at least half of his 
book is "practical criticism," the failure to engage these conditions is striking. 
Moreover, tIus failure is not a given of structuralist thinking. All we need 
witness are Jan Mukafovsk)r's Aesthetic Function, Norm, and Value as Social 
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Facts or Claude Uvi-Strauss's criticism of Propp's II formalism II to be reminded 
that the aim of structuralism is to account for all the systems that compose a text, 
among which are the literary and the referential worlds. 
T~ issue of mimesis is of particular importance, I think, because Genette's 
position is meant as a corrective to much previous imprecision on the subject. He 
claims that 
in contrast to dramatic representation, no narrative can "show" or 
II imitate" ,me story it tells. All it can 'do is tell it in a manner which 
is detailed, precise, "alive," and in .that way give more Of less the 
illusion of mimesis-which is the only narrative mimesis, for this single 
and sufficient reason: that narration, oral or written, is a fact of language, 
and language signifies without imitating .... [M]imesis in words can only 
be mimesis of words. (164) 
Presumably the world needs to be remind'ed of this I' fact" from time to time. 
Lessing and Thomas Twining performed dus service for the eighteenth century, 
although the effects of their efforts were soon blunted. But Genette lives in 
another time. During the past century the concept of imitation has been examined 
with enough sophistication to make .his disclaimer appear as simplistic as the 
confusion of description with imitation that he criticizes. Perhaps the exposure 
to such errors in researching Mimolo giques has led Genette to this II hard line" 
on mimesis, but his own insights into narrative structures are enormously suggestive 
in the argument for narrative iconicity. 
For example, Genette repeatedly emphasizes the fact that narrative time can 
never be treated as an absolute, in that its only "real" basis is the definitionally 
variable reading time. Nevertheless, he argues, temporal relations can be 
established in the relative -amount of narrative space an author uses to depict an 
extent of story time, ,'Ilhis resulting in four narrative "movements": ellipsis 
(zero narrative time for n story time), summary (NT<ST), scene (NT=ST), 
and pause (n NT=zero ST). In the rhyrbm (anisoobrony for Genette) of 
narration that a writer establishes, these different relations would seem inevitably 
tied to mimesis. It is not that NT can .actually equal ST, but that its extent can 
make it either more or less equivalent to ST in comparison to other narrative 
extents. In Peircean tenns, this contrast is the difference between an image and 
a diagram: both rare iconic signs, the one sharing substantive ttaits with its 
referent, the other sharing the relations '3l1long its components with its 
referent. Thus, if an author systematically mixed the four movements he would 
be foiling mimesis, since the relations among the extents of his various paragraphs 
of chapters would not correspond to the relations among the extents of his 
narrated episodes. On the other hand, if an author consistently used any of the 
four temporal structures he would be diagrammatically iconic, although the kind 
or narrative that would eventuarte from certain choices might be deviant, or 
even unrealizable. But such an outcome in itself would be worth investigating. 
I And indeed, the reasons why certain techniques create the "illusion of i mimesis" while others do not is .also worth looking into. If a scene creates 
I this illusion, is this not because relative co-extension in time is the basis for 
Ii' narrative iconicity rather '!!han some simple-minded notion of absolute equality? 
, But Genette's elimination of all questions of literary and extra-artistic norms 
I 
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is equally disturbing. Given the aruUytic tools he supplies, one would expect 
to be able to describe general trends in Ithe history of narrative that would carry 
value-laden names, such as "traditional," "classic," or "innovative." Not 
only are these trends not provided in Narrative Discourse, but no theory is 
offered as to how such norms, once determined, could be iIlltegrated into an 
overall structural analysis. This omission is all the more striking when 
Genette actually claims a virtuosity in Proust's handling of certain devices. Where 
is the careful establishment of the norms against which Proust's perfomance is to 
be measured as unique, .and where the outline of the cultural values tihat will 
make that particular uniqueness admirable? 
In addition to literary norms, Genette ignores what Boris Uspenskij and 
Michail Bachtin would term the "ideological plane" of llMration. Uspenskij 
treats this as one of four components of point of view in his Poetics of Com-
position, and though neither his nor Bachtin's discussion has the precision of 
Genette's work, roe positioning of a text vis-a.-vis ideological values is not 
an aspect of its structure that can be omitted simply because it is hard to talk 
about. Surely the strength of structur.alism was that it took on methodo-
logical problems so complicated that whole disciplines had to be constructed 
in order to solve them. It would seem nhat narratology has a long way to go 
before it lives up to the aspiration of being a structuralist discipline. 
WENDY STEINER 
University of Pennsylvania 
Critical Assumptions by K. K. Ruthven. Cambridge, London, New York, Mel-
bourne: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Pp. x + 263. $23.95. 
The English used to look askance at American books of criticism: they were 
"Gennanic," which meant that rhey probed too deeply, doggedly, and artlessly. 
The Americans used to speak about English criticism as "genteel," which meant 
that it didn't probe deeply enough. That division belongs pretty much to the 
past. There are only occasional outbreaks illustrating it, and then only when 
critics on one side or another relax their preoccupation wi,tm the French. K. K. 
IJ\Iuthven teaches in New Zealanld, and his book is written fOir students, not for 
critical theorists. AB such, it can be partially excused for not probing very deeply 
and for its plethora of quotation and reference. But not entirely. 
Ruthven is interested in what he regards as II four recmrent problems in the 
history of criticism." They are genesis, fonn, meaning, and value. In twelve 
chapters how these problems have been approaahed is disaossed, always with 
voluminous reference and quotation, the latter always brief. I open the book at 
random and discover on one page (122) the following referred to: Tennyson, 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, Nabokov, Chaplin, Delalande (a writer invented by 
Nabokov), Borges, Kafka, Browning, Peckham, Joyce, Rabelais, LeClercq. 
Browne, Eliot, Homer, Pound, Li Po, Discours SUT les ombres (by Delalande), 
Pseudodoxia Epidemica, the metaphysical poets, Ulysses, Odyssey, and Cathay. 
And this is a slightly shortened, section-ending page! 
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One wonders what the influence might be here, and the mind turns to 
Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism, astonishing in its range of reference. 
(Frye also gets the last word in this book.) But onc concludes that in this case 
something may have' gone a little wrong: we may have here a not wholly self-
conscious version of what Frye called the Menippean satire, which unfolds 
erudition in the way a peacock displays its tail. What is lacking to make the 
formula work is Mcnippean wit and speculati_on. TIns book does not work out a 
position but examines or, let us say~ accumulates descriptions of critical trends. 
(Of course, it does have -a position, which is tacitly held or slipped in in the 
form of brief concluding assertions at the close of chapter sections.) 
The descriptions are broadly conceived. Ruthven is not concerned to look 
v:ery deeply into the work of anyone critical theorist or even one teJ\1t. The 
manner is to pile up a series of brief quotations, allusions, and descriptions. Thus 
in the chapter ~'Imitation and Originality" the trhree-page section on "Ori-
ginality as a mark of genius" begins "\vith a five-"\vord quotation from Johnson's 
Imlac, offers a generalization about the eighteenth-century attitude toward 
originality as against imitation, quotes Young (thirteen words), notes the 
connection of originality to the contemporary interest in "genius," alludes to 
two scholarly essays on this matter, quotes Pope on Shakespeare (thirteen words), 
names four eighteenth-century books on originality, offers seventeen lines of 
comment on Horace, moves on to discuss the fashion of natural genius, quoting 
Johnson, Young again, Croce, Anthony Storr on psychiatrists, and a gaggle of 
of others in a concluding paragraph. The whole chapter is sixteen pages long, 
is mainly about the imitation of nature or of human actions. Its introductory 
section ends with the following: 
... there was once a time, not so very long ago, when it seemed the 
sensible thing to accept the impossibility of saying anything original 
and to devote one's energies instead to saying what has been said before, 
but in a manner much superior to that of one's predecessors. This is 
what the theory of imitCltion is all about. [my italics] 
But it is not what TIhe theory of imitation is all about, as anyone who has read 
Republic, Poetics, 'and McKeon on this subject knows very well. Imitation has 
always had two faces as Pope remarked of Virgil's copying nature when he 
copied Homer. Ruthven, of course, knows this (he has apparently read every-
thing, .as attested to by forty-seven pages of footnotes), but he doesn't examine 
the deeper aspects of imitation that invoke what he ,himself calls "transactions 
with reality." We are not encouraged when we read in the next line: ,. The 
earliest surviving literary theory of imitation is in the Poetics of Aristotle." 
This may be strictly true, but Plato had a theory of imitation with at least 
literary implications, and Aristotle was concerned enough ,about it to try to 
illlSwer it. Ruthven does not discuss it and even seems to be saying that it does 
not exist. This is an example of a flaw in the way Ruthven's book carries on. 
Despite its barrage of erudition from nearly everywhere in the history of 
criticism, the book is fundamentally ahistorical. That Aristotle offered his 
dleory in a situation that involved Plato, that he worked with Plato's tenns, 
and that this is part of his meaning are not made clear. 
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The same problem comes up in Ruthven's treatment of the Kantian /notion 
of beautiful uselessness without Gttention to any of the reasons why such a 
notion should arise or how uselessness in some authors becomes an ironic term 
and even a moralistic one. The notion of "purposiveness without purpose" 
or "intemal purposiveness" receives similarly superficial treatment in connection 
with the problem of intention:. This is a somewhat odd perspective and results 
in distortion. Ruthven <loes not halt long enough to examine any idea deeply 
and for the most part he ignores historical context. In a book on Nietzsche, 
WaIter Kaufmann argues quite rightly that we won't understand Nietzsche unless 
we ask what he opposed, what he sought to overcome, what his problems were. 
Any thinker's expression must be treated in this way if one is Ito be accurate. 
There are a number of statements in rthe book that if not entirely inaccurate 
are not responsible either. Six examples: 
1. "The reason for this is that organicist critics from Coleridge onwards have 
generally agreed that the two kinds of form are in fact antithetical to one another." 
Why not from Schlegel onwards? 
2. "For if everything in a poem is predetermined to tJhis ettent, involuntary 
experiences bring us about as close as we are ever likely to get to an aw.areness 
of those unconsciuus drives which shape everything we do." The logic of this 
is slippery. Perhaps a step is missing. 
3. " ... A Vision dictated to [Yeats] through the medium of his wife by a 
supematura!l. being called Michael Robanes." Robartes is a fictional, but not a 
supernatural being, and he did not dictate A Vision via Mrs. Yeats. He did not 
dictate it at all. 
4. "So Forster concludes that since 'all literature tends towards a condition of 
anonymity,' any signature on it can only be a ·distraction. .As if to- test the truth 
of this claim, I. A. Richards was shortly to circulate unsigned poems for com-
ment .... " In spite of the disclaiming "as if," this plays fast and loose with 
Richards' intention, probably in order to effect a transition in the discourse. 
5. " .•. a novel semingly without authorial presence. Such too was Joyce's 
ambition in writing A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Mrl.n." But it is 
Stephen, .as Ruthven allows, who preaches this theory, and there is authorial 
presence in certain ways in the novel. 
6. "Oh 'darkly, deeply, beautifully blue', 
As someone somewhere sings about the sky. 
The' someone' Byron fails to recall is Southey .••• " But has Byron forgotten? 
Or is it a sly put-down? Now this is a minor matter, las are the others. But 
I am compelled to wonder how many more there are and whether or not they 
may not be products of a characteristically loose method of quoting and alluding. 
Nevertheless, I find that this book could be helpful to students and to teachers. 
For students it identifies clusters of fundamental critical issues and provides a. 
compendium of quotations and references that can be followed up. For the 
teacher, it can be a foil. The teacher can expand upon it, fill in its gaps, quarrel 
with the brevity of Ruthven's accounts, and point to the author's own assumptions. 
Ruthven never takes any question to the point where -anyrlHng resembles a 
last word is said. 
J 
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Yet he does make some utterances as if mhey were last words. In the end 
he is, I think, a more sophisticated version of the English type of critic thought 
by Americans to be "genteel." This newest version has metamorphosed into an 
antitheoretical skeptic. I have some sympathy with a form of antitheoretical 
theory, but I have very little \vith RjUthven's ahistorical version of it, which 
leaves critical theory in a shambles. He conveys the impression of looking dO"\Vll 
on a jumble of perspectives, ideas, quotations, and phrases, a scene of folly that 
adds up Ito little and has had no direction. The reason for this is principally 
his ignoring the historical moment of every critical utterance, the absence of which 
generates the absence of the dignity and seriousness of the critical discourses to 
which he alludes. TIlls is not what we find when we go back to the texts them-
selves. I acknowledge that many of these complaints can be made to stand against 
any effort of Ruthven's sort. I ought to lmow, because I wrote a book of 
tills same general kiryd about twelve years ago. 
The final complaint that can be made against Ruthven's land other suoh books 
is that-in rthis critical climate-they ,are out of date by the .time that they arrive. 
In Ruthven's case the omissions arc rather glaring. There is no treatment of the 
so-called post-structuralist movement. That couldn't be accomplished unless 
Ruthven had paid more attention to recent critical theory in general. One finds 
only passing mention of the structuralist movement (Barthes is mentioned), no 
discussion of Heidegger and phenomenological criticism (except brief mention of 
Poulet and Miller), hardly anytlllng on modenl hermeneutics (no mention of 
Ga'damer and Ricoeur, though Hirsch is alluded to and two chapters are devoted 
to meaning), only brief mention of speech-act theory (Austin and Searle), and 
no mention of Dcrridean deconstnlCtion whatsoever. Nor does Ruthven allude 
to some of the critics who have tried to resolve the differences upon which 
Ruthven builds his chapters-Krieger on imitation .and expression, for example. 
Still, the book is erudite, readable, and, within its bounds, informative. No 
matter that the map it lays out is, in the end, unconsciously Meruppean. 
The price for this sort of book is astonishing, even in .an age of astonishing prices 
for books. 
HAZARD ADAMS 
University of Washington 
Dante, Poet of the Desert: History and Alleg01'y in the Divine Comedy 
by Giuseppe Mazzotta. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. Pp, xv + 
343. $20.00. 
Giuseppe Mazzotta's valuable contribution to Dante studies is a tour de force 
of harmonization which may well make him the Concordiae comes of the 
profession. At first glance this dense volume (weighted down at times by a 
ponderous latinate style) seems to offer what might be seen as I< a typically Italian" 
(though for that reason not necessarily unsatisfactory) solution to a difficult 
problem. As in the story of the Italian judge who listens to plantiff and defend-
ent and tells them they are both right, and then answers a third-party observer 
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who objects tJhat they cannot both be right by saying" you are right! ", Mazzotta 
seems to have discovered the way of compromise which bridges the gap of 
discord separating the" literalists," who see Dante's way of writing as one which 
imitates the allegorical mode of Scripture, and the "fabulists," who see the 
theological, figural and prophetic elements of the Comedy as nothing more than 
part of Dante's strategy as a producer of fiction. 
At worst Mazzotta's study, or that portion, at least, which deals with the 
question of allegory, will be cast aside as the machinations of a "neutral angel" 
(of which danger he seems to be aware, just as he seems to be .aware thalt his own 
text, like Dante's in Mazzotta's formulation, may be its own most subversive 
adversary). At best, by denying us the critical palliative that we seek as a 
source of relief from Dante's dolorous complexities, he may have succeeded in 
demonstrating that the Divine Comedy is not only a monument to medieval 
encyclopedism, but a genuine act of reconciliation of the ultimate immutable 
reality of the Logos with the contingent corruptible reality of the text. 
The general purpose of this study is to "probe Dante's sense of history" 
by focussing on the "structure and language of history ... the relationship 
between history and literary language" and the vexing question of allegory 
accompanied by the related ambiguities which ]Vlazzotta calls the "historicity 
of interpretation" (p. 3). The author begins with an examination of the image 
of the Old Man of Crete (the Gran Veglio of Inferno XIV) and the related figure 
of C3Jto in Purgatory I and II. In so doing he shows quite convincingly (with 
considerable improvement over the original dissertation chapter) how Roman 
history figures as part of salvation history and the redemptive process. In Chapter 
IV (Vergil and Augustine) he shows how the" theological harmonization of the 
earthly -and heavenly cities" is made possible by "a par,rial revision of St. 
Augustine's view of Roman history" (p. 6). Central to the argument are 
the divergent notions of Dante and Augustine on the historicity of Vergil's 
Aeneid and the role of ~ome's history in the process of redemption, and in a 
movement through the inevitable corruptibility of the secular order to the 
ultimate goal of eternal glorification. The Aeneid is seen, from Dante's 
rectified perspective, as a poem of love and a book of history" whioh, though 
immersed in a condition of temporality and finitude, strains toward the enduring 
atemporality of Heaven and enacts a view of history as a sequence of events 
significant in God's providential plan" (p. 158). l\1azzotta ultimately and most 
convincingly argues that Dante "implies that history enacts typologically the 
pattern of Exodus" (p. 182). TIus, in turn, implies, it seems to me, that the 
text is rightly to be regarded as a figura of history. It is history in the same way 
thart: history, like the meta-statements of historiography, is grammar and text. In 
a logo centric world fraught with semiotic complexities and hermeneutic perils, one 
which ranges from the emanation of the divine Word to the cloacal sememes 
trumpeted by the devils of the infernal realm, one must confront the problem 
of interpretation, as Mazzotta does in a strenuous ·and imaginative way in Ius 
concluding chapters. 
The final chapters, dealing with literary lustory, allegory and the language 
of faith, are perhaps the most provocative but also the most problematic. If 
the Aeneid is to be understood as Iustory, then" history," as lvlazzotta has noted 
--------------------__________________ IL 
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earlier (p. 158), "cannot be taken literally." By the same token, he concludes, 
"The distinction bet\veen poetic allegory and theological allegory depends not 
on an intrinsic separation of truth and lies in the literal sense, but on Gn aat of 
interpretation: 'the theologians take the literal sense otherwise tha,t the poets do' ; 
the truth of the literal sense, then, lies not in the actual enunciation, but in what 
the literal sense signifies" (p. 235). History and historiography (including the 
records of conversion) suffer the "ambiguity of the letter H provoked by wlut 
in Peircean terms might be called the inevitable flight of the interpretant. The 
dilemma of unlimited semiosis acts to subvert the text as authority and causes 
the interpreter to en joy the pleasures of the promised end as long as he is 
immersed in the "historicity of interpretation." The text, then, becomes the 
desert where temptations are encountered. What is not especially clear in 
Mazzotta's argument of harmonization, where the truth depends on the inter-
pretation of tlhe enunciation, is the conviction that the text may be hermeneu-
tically Qlosed -at tlhe same time that it is semiotically open. It is an open desert, 
a " writerly " text in Barthes' sense, which threatens the reader with the temptation 
of a new interpretation, while at the same time it leads that reader to one 
certain telos. The reader will become either an Adam or a Christ by anralogylo 
As in the threefold temptation of Christ in the desert, the Tempter may use the 
word (Scripture) itself to deceive, and only a process of "rightly dividing the 
word of truth (2 Tim. 2.15) " will dispel the deception. Just as Satan's misuse 
Jf Scripture, though literally accurate, does not invalidate the literal accuracy 
of tlhe text its01f, just so does Mazzotta's attempt to resolve the question of 
trurth at the interpretive level leave inviolate Singleton's notion of the funda-
mental veracity of the enunciation itself. TI-us ,does not mean that we can 
confidently 1l11swer the question" Did Dante really go to Hell?," which, for most 
readers, I would guess, remains a valid one, but rather that the verbal incarnation 
which is presented as the literal text is indeed a non-deceptive interp1'etation of a 
spiritual and intellectual event. 
Mazzotta has written a fine, well-documented book which is a significant 
addition to the shelves of Dante criticism. It sheds much light on the important 
questions of history and Vergil's contribution to the Divine Comedy as well as 
that of the poem's meaning. The questions it raises M'e significant ones wI-uch 
ought to continue to ·demanrd the attention of Dante scholars. 
ANDREA DI TOMMAso 
Wayne State University 
The Comic A1atrix of Sbakespeare's Tragedies by Susan Snyder. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979. Pp. ix + 185. $12.50. 
One interesting feature of tllis book is that its critical method works against 
the very assumptions it seeks to prove. Susan Snyder observes that since Shake-
speare wrote ten "successful" comedies before he wrote Jlis great tragedies, 
" ... it seems probable that he \vould use the dramatic conventions in which he 
was most at home, the world of romantic comedy, ,as a point of reference and 
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departure in developing tragic form" (p. 4). Aside f.rom the problem in her 
notion of what was "successful," she does not explain why Shakespeare's rtragic 
form should have developed from his comedies rather tthan from his histories, 
his poetry, and his early tragedies nor why he was more at home in one 
genre than another. To address such questions would require some consideration 
of the economic, social, and literary historical factors that affected the pro-
duction and reception of Shakespeare's texts. Instead she takes Northrop Frye's 
argument for comedy and tragedy as her critical morlel and supplements it 
vvith Suzanne Langer's discussion of comic rhythm. Hence from the outset 
the book posits an assumption about the historical development of Shakespeare's 
literary forms to be argued in terms of a critical theory which is radically 
paradigmatic and thus cannot account for historical development. 
Erofessor Snyder's first chapter surveys comic conventions in eighteen" popular" 
comedies of the 1580's and 90's, "popular" apparently meaning public theater 
productions. Much of this chapter covers familiar ground, but the discussion docs 
not consider Rosalie Colie's work, particularly her Resources of Kind, and so we 
find conventions and devices discussed as if they were largely indigenous to comedy. 
The second chapter concerns Romeo and Juliet and Othello, two Italianate 
tr·agedies employing comic conventions "to reveal the vuh1erability of love, 
threatened from witJhout in Romeo and Juliet, from within in Othello" (p. 89). 
The third chapter argues that comic convention enabled Shakespeare to explore 
the issues of human power and benevolence in Hamlet, while the last chapter 
argues that grotesque comedy is Shakespeare's way of asking questions "about 
the purpose of all human experiences" (p. 165). For all their fine moments, 
the readings of the plays as a whole tend to treat Shakespeare as an autho.r 
writing without 'J historioal audience and yet sharing the eighteenth century's 
hierarchy of literary forms, the nineteenth century's belief in universal human 
truths and the twentieth century's modernist sensibilities. There is no historica1 
change from Romeo and Juliet to King Lear in Professor Snyder's system. The 
problem centers on ,a notion of literary convention as somehow independent of the 
fluctuations of social history, and hence free of the exigencies of Shakespeare's 
needs to communicate with a specific audience. Thus despite the virtues of some 
insightful discussions-particularly in Chapters Two and Four-this book begs 
the very questions it seeks to address. 
LEONARD T ENNENHOUSE 
Wayne State University 
Interpreting Interpreting: Interpreting Dickens' Dombey by Susan R. Horton. 
Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. Pp. 
xiii + 162. $12.00. 
This book is an ambitious project. Susan Horton wants" not so much to discuss 
what Dombey and Son means as to find out how all novels mean" (ix). 
Her title is, from this point of view, indicative of her emphasis. Three quarters· 
of her book is concerned with the nature of interpretation, one quarter with 
Dickens. 
j 
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Specifically, Horton wants to defend the critical operation which produces 
an explication of a text against recent suggestions by Stanley Fish and E. D. 
Hirsch that, since this method cannot establish a single fixed meaning, critics 
should concern themselves with asking historical and sociological questions. 
In answer, Horton would like to show that a plurality of readings and a certain 
indeterminacy of meaning are inevitable and are not, in practice, incompatible 
with the "fiction of a stable entity" without which the interpretative process 
"spins off into outer space" (128): 
The center of Horton's attempt to reconcile the subjective and objective 
elements in interpretation lies in her discussion of what she calls the hermeneutical 
model. The model essentially articulates the assumption of New Criticism that 
the work was self-defining and that the individual details becomes meaningful 
or symbolic within the context of some conception of the whvle. New 
Criticism was based on a certain idea of the second reading of a work which 
assumed that tJhe critic brought to this rea.ding a total, spatial vision of the text. 
Horton argues that the expectation of a single mooning is the result of this too-
simple assumption. She shows that various critics of Dombey have defined both 
part and whole differently-the part as word, sentence, or paragraph; the whole 
as single text, the author's entire work, or all the works in a genre-and that 
each of these assumptions has resulted in a radically different reading. Finally, 
drawing an analogy to the" uncertainty principle" in modern physics, she argues 
the ultimate unpicnuability of the whole and, consequently, the inevitable partial-
ity of any reading. 
This partiality, then, is not so much Q failme of interpretation as its inevitable 
condition. A reading is always partially trUe, partially false. .aut nhis does not 
mean that all readings are equally valid. Once the variables of interpretation are 
known, the various definitions of part and whole sketched out, it is possible to 
define a certain area of meanings, although, because of the variations in the 
interpreter, this area can never be absolutely fixed. In addition the critic can 
aspire to the widest possible context and can avoid being trapped in a single 
interpretation by constantly invoking other alternatives. 
Horton's discussion of Dombey itself is a clear example of the practical effects 
of her theoretical conclusions. Since she has rejeoted the possibility of a spatialized 
vision of me work, her approach involves itself with the temporality of the 
reading experience and, in this sense, it is close to what she refers to as Stanley 
Fish's reader-.response cri-ticism. Even when she is invoking the widest possible 
context, which, for her, is provided by the letters Dickens wrote during Dombey's 
composition, this context is used not so much to prov1de an overall statement of 
the theme of the novel as to relate certain passages to certain effects Dickens 
wanted to produce in the reader. And even -tlhe tentative definition of theme 
which her argument allows is constantly qualified by an immediate reference to 
other approaches which would ignore or subordinate this nheme. 
I think this is a fair statement of Horton's argument. What can be said about 
it? 
Most obviously, it is clear that me relation she establishes between the 
critic and the work remains entirely traditional. Despite her references to the 
" fiction n of a stable center to the work there is no doubt that, for Horton, 
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the text does have meanings which are in some sense the expression of the I I 
author's intentions. Her argument is not at all about the possibility of such 
meaning. She simply answers a certain skepticism about its determination by 
developing a theory of perspectivism which saves partial interpretation. All 
this is apparent in Hotton's central example of the nature of the text, Isamu 
Noguohi's sculpture entitled "Cubic Pyramid." The polished sides of this 
piece reflect both changing patterns of light and the perceiver himself. In order to 
see nhe work ,as a totality, the critic would have to stand befoTe it for eternity. 
His view is inevitably limited. But, on the other hand, there is no doubt that 
the ,'lork is there, that it is the product of an intention. The solidity of its 
form and intention are, for her, one with the solidity of its physical presence. 
Her sense of a totality which is the origin and sum of indeterminate perspectives 
is one posiblc explanation for certain conflicting tendencies in Horton's book'. 
On the one hand, she obviously wants to free criticism from the tyranny of the 
idea of a single, total meaning so that it can admit subjective factors and celebrate 
what she refers to as the" nice fillips" (23) in a work. At the same time, 
however, Horton can never relax in her discussion of these limited moments. 
Each interpretation must be immediately balanced by another interpretation and 
that by another interpretation. Her discussion consequently proceeds with a 
kind of nervous impatience which, for me, robs it of much of its value. This 
impatience, her search for the widest context, and her references to her book 
as Lan attempt to "stand aside" (3) from individual interpretations in a way 
which would reveal, and presumably escape, the inevitability of limitation which 
is the center of her argument, all suggest that the idea of a unified vision of the 
work attracts her in a way which makes the fall into a restricted point of view 
claustrophobic. 
How can we explain the persistent attraction which tIus vision has for Horton? 
Her own example of Noguchi's sculpture suggests one answer. Horton 
tells us that she chose Dombey and Son because she" loves" (11) it. The viewer 
before the "CubIc Pyramid" is like t'he critic before the text is like the lover 
before a beloved. This beloved is various, but this only increases her attractive-
ness. Others may love her for these various qualities: her hair, her eyes, her 
appearance in a certain light, her" nice fillips." The true critic, the true lover 
desires nhese. But he loves more. He loves what she really is, her inner self, 
the" protean" (55) form of Dickens within the novels, the solidity of the stone 
behind the reflecting surface. 
It is interesting to think, in tIus context, about the relationship between the 
critic's desire for a total picture of the work and the structure of a certain kind 
of romantic love. Since, moreover, the protean form the viewer would glimpse 
in the mirrored surface of the "Cubic Pyramid" would obviously be his own, 
it would be even more interesting to submit this relationship to Lacan's 
discussion of narcissism in his article on the stade du miroir. 
But Horton's book is most striking in its illustration of how a theory which, 
on a manifest level, denies the critic access to such a totalizing vision, can be 
used to invoke the presence of this vision. From this point of view, a certain 
land of theorizing operates on the model of Freudian denial. It posits the 
existence of the very object it rejects. Loss is recuperated in the act of its 
acknowledgement. 
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Theory seems to function like this in Interpreting Interpreting. Certainly this 
would explain why, as I have said, no limited interpretation is ever allowed to 
develop without constantly being interrupted by repetitious theoretical statements 
which, despite ,their insistence on limitation, serve to keep tlhe idea of the 
whole constantly before us. The image of the whole, the protean form of 
Dickens, is the real emotional center of this book, and Horton is never able to 
free herself from it enough to accept the necessity of restricted points of view 
or of the limitations of her own image as a critic. 
Roy ROUSSEL 
State University of New York at Buffalo 
Virginia lVoolf by l\!lichael Rosenthal. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1979. Pp. 270. $15.00. 
Any book written about Virginia Woolf these days is likely to be outmoded 
even before it reaches print. This is partly the case with Michael Rosenthal's 
recent study, which takes current feminist and biographical approaches to Woolf 
as the occasion to proclaim "primacy of form" as the key to her achievement. 
In 1977-while Rosenthal must have been slogging away on his closing chapters-
Hermione Lee was employing the same rationale in the opening lines of her newly 
published Tbe Novels of Virginia Woolf: "This is not a book about Blooms-
bury, lebianism, madness or suicide. It does not deal with Virginia Woolf as 
a feminist, as an owner of the Hogarth Press, as a critic and essayist, or as a 
biographer. It is a literary criticism of her nine novels, written in the hope 
of turning attention back from the life to the fictional work. ... " 
Worse yet, 1\11s. Lee was also usurping his major thesis, his similar concen-
tration on Woolf's "continuing attempt, in every new work, to match her 
vision of reality with its appropriate form." Rosenthal would go her three better, 
of course, by dealing with Woolf as a critic, essayist, and biographer' as 
well as a novelist, on the valid premise that tJhese activities also have their 
appropriate fOTll1S. But he "\vould agree with her that "criticism of Virginia 
Woolf which is emphatically ferninist cannot get very far with any of the fiction, 
except perhaps Orlando.." In 1978, alas, a year after Lee published these 
remarks, and while Rosenuhal was no doubt polishing the accepted version of his 
manuscript, Phyllis Rose got very far indeed, in W011Zan of Letters: A Life of 
Virginia Woolf, with feminist readings of all the fiction. These readings were 
substantially more original, moreover, in opening up the feminist dimensions of 
each text, than those by Lee and Rosenthal-and decidedly more exciting. 
Are formal readings of Woolf passe? Certainly with Woolf as with other 
major modenl novelists we have had ,them ad nauseum. A list of critics who 
attempted them-and who invoke "primacy of form" in their behalf-would :fill 
the rest of this review. Wh2.t is new about Rosenthal's approach, let me ac ... 
cordingly add, is the doggedness and lucidity with which he pursues those diary 
entries about originating shapes, forms, designs (as opposed to characters or 
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themes) from which the experimental works proceed. No previous :=;tudy-not 
even Lee's-has followed these entries so tenaciously, nor explained their impli-
cations 50 precisely, nor made such an impressive case for their centrality as 
keys to her various artifacts. As I have implied, the readings arrived at are 
inevitably familiar; there is no plethora here of dazzling insights, no resolution of 
old cruxes: but the elegance and care with which the fannaJ dynamics of each 
text are defined is altogether exemplary. No onc in that imagined list above has 
done such justice to Woolf's formal intentions and their literary unfoldings. 
To clear the way for that enterprise Rosenthal writes related chapters on 
vVoolf's life, her Bloomsbury circle, and the problem of defining her fictional 
commitment. In the first chapter he tries to separate her literary legacy as Leslie 
Stephen's daughter and Thoby Stephen'S sister from whatever might detract 
from it. The conversations among leading intellectuals in her childhood home, 
the great resources of her father's library, the circle of Cambridge intellectuals 
her brother brought to her in later years, become salient; and nhe early bouts 
with madness aftf:lr crucial family deaths, her sexual exploitation by an older half-
brother, her resentment of male privilege and male dominance, are seen as serious 
obstacles and conditions which, by 1922, when her great experimental period 
began, were either surmounted or subordinated or kept in tremulous abeyance. 
From that point on until her suicide in 1941 she lived chiefly in and through her 
writing, where her chief commitment-as t1he rhird chapter holds-was to 
design. 
This view of her life and art suffers again from supercession; it fails to include 
some of her own revelations, available since 1976 in lHoments of Being, which help 
to explain why her mother and half-sister Stella were at least as crucial to her 
literary development as her father and her brother Thoby. Though Rosenthal 
knows how such late-Victorian domestic" angels" figure in her later animosities, 
he doesn't see how they figure also in her selfless artistry and-paradoxically 
enough-in her selfless devotion to feminist causes. He arrives, then, at a 
curiously encapsulated life which leads-as we shall see-to a curiously encap-
sulated formal study. 
The Bloomsbury chapter, which might haye widened the study's scope, 
tends largely to preserve its narrow focus. Though Rosenthal is plainly 
enamored of Bloomsbury and feels at home in its heady environs, he dismisses its 
present standing as the precursor of contemporary liberations and defines it 
rather as a conservative enclave-rational, civilized, affluent-whose ethical and 
aesthetic concerns were essentially plivileged. As he later shows, moreover, 
these same concerns-as reflected in Woolfs privileged life and art-would even-
tually appeal to "common readers" belonging to a similar class. Thus Blooms-
bllry becomes for Rosenthal a metaphor for his own and Virginia Woolf's 
readers, an educated, prosperous, and largely academic group in which current 
liberationists-if not excluded-are put in their properly subordinatl!d places. 
The rescuing of 'Voolf from her present admirers takes a strange form, indeed, 
in this oddly regressive study of her designing ways. 
But there is no gainsaying its dogged achic\yements. After dealing with 
'''oolf's convcntional realism in her first two noycls, Tbe Voyage Out and Nigbt 
and Day. Rosenthal moyes confidently to the elucidation of her first expcrimental 
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novel, Jacob's Room. Through careful analysis, he isolates the different formal 
principles at work in the three experimental stories-u The Mark on the Wall," 
"Kew Gardens," and" An Unwritten Novel" which-v\loolf had conceived as 
"taking hands and dancing in unity)) to produce] acob's Room; then he demon-
strates how in fact these principles do work to unify that novel-whioh suffers 
nonetheless from heavyhanded explanations and uncertain narrative focus. \Nhere 
Rosenthal moves nimbly and lucidly through these paces, producing what I talee to 
be the best account of the novel's form extant, his predecessor Lee begins with the 
same three stories but quickly bogs do\VI1 in the intricacies of verbal play. In 
general, she is more richly engaged with the novels than Rosenthal, but lacks his 
great gift for describing fonnal topographies. 
Rosenthal's formal expertise works well on at least three more occasions: 
with the dubious "Time Passes" section of To tbe Lighthouse, which I treat 
quite otherwise in Criticism, Winter 1979, but for which he supplies the best 
formal justification I have seen; with the somber distillations of inner essences 
in that stillborn classic, Tbe Waves, which he unstintingly admires; and with 
the livelier uncertainties of Between the Acts, where again his reading ranks with 
the best we ,have. He is alert always to the author's concern with creative effort 
in the face of chaos, and to those globed "moments of being" which so many 
critics have remarked; he is alert to isolation and unity as constants in her 
fictive world, and to the coalescences of times past and present; and he is 
attentive, finally, to the social dimensions of her texts, to her feminism, her 
pacifism, her diatribes against conversion, her concern with sexual identity. 
Unfortunately, he is something less than alert to Woolf's personal stake in her own 
creative efforts, which may explain why his approach to these and other novels 
seems relatively shallo\v. As he himself observes of the pageant in Between the 
Acts: "VVhat matters are not the merits of (he play but the ongoing nature of 
the creative process itself .... Miss La Trobe's aJbility to continue in spite of the 
difficulties she faces constitutes a triumph of the spirit in which 'Vaalf, in this 
novel, ultimately rests." Of course, the merits of Woolf's" plays" still matter; 
but since she also had to face ongoing difficulties throughout her career, and since 
Rosenthal sets them aside in his opening ohapter, there is no triumph of the 
spirit in this study, nor of the spirit's changing forms. 
We are not even told, for instance, that it was her shift of allegiance 
from Mansfield's external impressionism to Joyce's internal stre-am which helped 
her to solve her most ghLring difficulty in Jacob's Room-her avoidance of inner 
life-in Mrs. Dallo·wCf'jl. Her discovery of "her own voice" in the latter novel, 
her sudden access to "new maturity," comes sui gelleris, and Joyce is given no 
credit at all for showing her how the mind's quickness might be used in apprehend-
ing death, as in the cemetery scene in Ulysses she so admired. Nor is death 
itself seen as an ongoing problem with whioh she bravely wrestles in these 
novels; it is simply a local theme, h:mdled fla\vlessly through appropriate forms. 
We do learn here that Mrs. Dalloway was originally intended to commit suicide; 
but Rosenthal never questions Woolfs motives in shifting that fate onto her 
hapless double, Septimus Warren Smith, nor in shifting the blame for it onto 
two complacent doctors, Holmes and Bradshaw, in whose excoriation Rosenthal 
sees ".a splendid summary" of Bloomsbury's case against "a whole world 
I 
I 
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view ... which abhors diversity" and subdues people "to its own restricted 
premises." Woolf's easy victory over these cardboard villains, her failure to 
provide a burden of ungrieved grief and guilt for 1\1rs. Dalloway like that her 
double has to bear, the vicarious triumphs over the exigencies of sex and death 
she then provides for Mrs. Dalloway, go unexamined. In other words, Rosenthal 
accepts unquestioningly the author's intentions and their flawless execution in 
this novel-indeed, in all the novels after Jacob's Room. As a result, he fails to 
penetrate with any depth into the human problems Woolf explores; he simply 
demonstrates the technical excellence of her design and the kind of "substances" 
which yield most readily to them: the disconnectedness of modern life; rhe 
heroine's life-savoring absorptions; her vital presence; and those globed moments 
which, like other artist-heroines, she achieves as stays against confusion. 
These are worthy subjects, in most cases admirably realized, but they scarcely 
exhaust nhe range and depth of Woolf's concern with human problems; nor 
does Rosenthal's approach seem especially sensitive to that rich concern. At one 
point, for instance, he claims that Lily Briscoe exists in To the Lighthouse" with-
out any particular sexual role at all"; she "seems essentially neuter, indifferent 
to sexual needs of any sort"; her resentment of Mrs. Ramsay's insistence on 
marriage defines "no alternative set of yearnings. Sex simply plays no part 
in Lily's life." As any observant reader might reply, Rosenthal overlooks her 
intense desire to join in the search for Minta Doyle's brooch, her fascination 
'With and repulsion from the fires of passion in Paul Rayley, the intensity of her 
bodily yearning for union with Mrs. Ramsay, and her fumbling attempt to recall 
the" electric thrill" of the Ramsays' marriage vow. Lily is less neuter, then, than 
bound by sexual tensions which she cannot resolve; and these tensions are furthe-r 
entwined ·with her whole attempt to make sense of the ~amsays' marriage, and 
of her own relation to them, and beyond that, 'With her curiously impacted 
grief for Mrs. Ramsay-an impaction shared with Woolf herself-on the 
release of which the completion of her painting seems to 'rest. Rosenthal's 
blindness to tIus network of intertwining feelings of confused love, frustrated 
passion, and blocked grief is more than a minor critical lapse: it is a blindness to 
the deeper sources of the novel's emotional power and to their origins in 
Woolf's personal dilemmas; a blindness, then, endemic to his method. As Woolf 
herself acknowledged, the writing of this novel released her from daily 
hallucinations of her parents' presence; it seems to have freed her, further, for 
the androgynous romp of Orlando and for her energetic feminist writings of the 
late 1920's and early 1930's. An unquestioning view of design and execution 
cannot explain such deeply personal triumphs. 
Nor can it explain why the force of her release divided and thwarted 
her energies when she came to write The Years in the mid-1930's. Though 
Rosenthal bows to Mitchell Leaska's essay on The Pargite1"s, the early novel-essay 
version of The Years which appeared in 1977, he has obviously failed to read or 
account for the text itself. The energy and freedom of its alternation between 
fictional passages and didactic commentaries speaks eloguently, I think, to the 
forcefulness of Woolf's feminist anger at this time. Though Rosenthal pulls 
Orlando and A Room of One's Own into his purview as substantial works of 
art, treats Three Guineas as an effective (if assailable) moral tract, and reads 
II 
I 
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Flush: A Biograpby as a playful feminist critique of Victorianism, he nowhere 
accepts Woolf's feminist convictions as sufficiently strong to split her intentions, 
challenge her belief in artistic autonomy, and move her, almost, to write a 
didactic novel. When she abandoned The Pargiters as too unwieldy, shelved 
its didactic chapters for later use in Three Guineas, and tried to aestheticize her 
convictions in The Years, she created the most tedious, labored, murky novel 
in her canon-as a great many critics have since attested. But for Rosenthill 
The Years is another flawless tr.iumph. He does not see how her blunted 
feminist anger, together with the book's unmanageable scope and realistic 
densities, led to endless interchangeable instances of failed communications, dismal 
discontinuities, and lifeless verbal resonances. Indeed, he doesn't even aclmowl-
edge that Woolf herself dismissed tlus "odious rice pudding of a book" as "a 
dank failure" and denied its autonomy by lumping it with Three Guineas" as one 
book" -as if still trying to rescue her abandoned novel-essay plan. 
By his concluding chapter, however, ltosenthal has moved onto safer ground. 
After defining Woolf's impressionistic criticism as essentially old-fashioned, 
and ber modernist pleading as essentially self-serving, he establishes the 
privileged social position from which suoh writing proceeds; and here his 
argument, that in her criticism at least she "\-vas not a radical social thinker, 
strikes me as well taken. But her criticism is not her fiction, and when Rosenthal 
claims that we must accept the fact of her privileged social stance "if we are 
-to appreciate her work in its totality," he merely describes his own privileged 
approach. Yet plainly he docs appreciate that totality, and is past master of its 
formal principles and enlivening designs. Readers will go to Ius book for these 
salient virtues for some time to come, and that too-for the critical spirit-is a 
worthy triumph. 
J\llARK SPILKA 
Brown University 
The Language of Puritan Feeling: An Exploration in Literature, Psychology, and 
Social History by David Leverenz. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 346. $22.00. 
The New Englanders created the West, wrote Jorge Luis Borges, and so we 
study the Puritans to death in order to understand how ,ve live. Though 
we already know more about the Puritans than any sane person would want to 
know, as Edmund Morgan once said, we continue to \vorry that ZOO-year bulge in 
history which they made, for we never seem to be quite sure we have got it right. 
And that has been one of the opportunities of studying the period: it is a field 
for intellectual experimentation. 
One of the inadvertent pleasures of the literary and historical studies 
of early America has been the relative absence of Freud. One could assume 
the general insanity and go on to more important matters! Now David Leverenz, 
encouraged by Norman O. Brown, Erik Erikson, and other nea-Freudians, lays 
these beautifully demented souls out on an imaginary historical couch for 
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elaborate psychoanalysis. And while the methodology is disgraceful (" to usc 
literature to apply psychoanalytic theory to social psychology"), the results arc 
enlightening. One is almost seduced by the experiment, if mainly because of 
their talent at interesting and entertaining us. 
Freud, Leverenz fantasizes, invented the Puritans. Theirs ,vas A Family 
Romance-at home, in the new society, and in a dramatic cosmos-in which 
thousands of sons reacted ambivalently to\vards thousands of fathers whose 
traditional roles were threatened by new social discontents and so rurned for 
tender mothering and grave fathering to The True Father, the Puritan God. 
These are the" anal dynamics" of early America. 
In New England, male roles (" reserved or an,-TIOUS fathering") and femalc 
roles C' good IJhough demanding mothering") widened, and this left all the 
Puritan children full of "reaction formations" and "a conscious dedication to 
anxiety" and "obsessional neuroses [t'hatJ reflect infantile internalization of 
patriarchal repression." Thus "their hunger for comprehensive patterns" and 
"their hunger for more specifically regressive pleasures." Which anxieties, 
howevcr, Leverenz struggles to assure us, they hlrned into virtues. Puritan 
frustrations turned (with Freud winking approvingly in the wings) into American 
productivity. "If all they could be sure of was anxiety, Ohat was to them a 
profoundly comforting thought." Not a happy state, though often a creative one. 
The Puritan sons' expectations of the fathers were impossibly high in America 
and got mixed results-ambivalcnce in an agc of dislocation. The failure of 
the fathers led to insecurity in the sons, a set of ambivalences which led to 
opposites in the etllucs and theology. Yet secure families led to stable communities 
and to wliversal securities. The subsuming of many conflicts in the expectation 
of order became-God knows how!-the transicnt genius of Puritanism. 
I-IO\vevcr, Leverenz' drama of Puritanism (" a confluence of two contradictory 
modcs of literary exprcssion: nursing fantasies and obsessive styles") is simply 
on too small a stage: the domestic. And while that may have been a dominant 
mctaphor in the sermons of the time (the family as "a little commonwealrh "), 
that hardly represents all that was going on in mind and body in that period~ 
Othcr analogies work as well and say as littlc. Lcvercnz docs not see that 
Puritanism, like Freudianism, ".vas built on analogies that broke down in thcir own 
minds and break down in ours. That saved it. 
At one point in his arrangcment of sixteenth- and scventecnth-century ideologies 
and conflicts into a Fremlian pattern, Lcvcrcnz commits an anachronism which 
givcs him away: "Childrcn \vcre thought of as both more and less than little 
adults, somc of our currcnt thcories to the contrary, and Puritans were especially 
sensitive to parental responsibilities." 'VVhat arc "current theories" doing in 
t/;,lt period? Can syntax thus convincingly accomplish the proximity of 
centurics? 
It is only b ... · a rhetorical stratcgy of implicit polarity that Levcrenz resolvcs 
the contradictions he finds in early Americ.1. Bur that takcs sJ,:il! at cquivoc:1tion. 
Anu that is dishonest. Contradictor,.,' sexual imagcry in the descriptions of Gael, 
fol' inst;mce, docs not mc:m the Plllit,lI1s were ambi\-alel1t abom their relation to 
God. The mixed Illcuphors are mixed meclphors. not mi:~cd fec!in3's. The 
cqlli\·ocarioTl.'i arc fun, as when Lc\-crenz calls God and Christ U a fantasy 
BOOK REVIEWS 283 
of mutual dependence between consenting adults)) or speaks of grown Puritan 
men with "feminine and infantile fantasies," but they are hardly enlightening 
about an age that had no such concepts. The critic ovcrrcacheth-to say old 
things in hip ways. 
Two major flaws make Leverenz' book fascinating. There is the flaw of 
the psychoanalyst: he actually takes these people seriously. And there is the 
flaw of the literary critic: texts are the truth. 
Leverenz the therapist doesn't distinguish between what in Puritan rhetoric 
is a revealing slip and what is merely flip. John Cotton's reference to himself as 
the breast of God in one of his sermons, for example, doesn't necessarily mean 
he is ambivalent about his masculinity, his patriarchal authority. It probably 
means Ihe has read his Bible and has simply found a metaphor he can use 
to show rlus joy in being a minister. Besides, if you put his analogy back into 
its context in his sermon, you find tha,t it hardly matters what he has at that 
point as long as it makes his point. This metaphor, and hundreds of others like 
it, is used initially, Leverenz admits, "for purposes of analogy" but soon is 
taken seriously when the analogue justifies the Freudian-Puritan model. 
Leverenz the literary critic, while admitting the annoying paucity of texts to tell 
us anything very conclusive about the Puritan mind, treats Ius few like holy 
scriptures, seeking "the emotional sources of Puritan rhetoric" in "great 
writers, our psychic barometers." In other words, lacking bodies, he analyzes 
words and deduces tlhe whole thf1ust of a society therefrom, forgetting how 
many other factors, artful and otherwise, made it. For him, the rhetoric of the 
period is "a self-referential system," a "transformational mirror for social 
history, especially for shared feelings." Leverenz discusses no more than a 
dozen New England sons and no more than three or four works of each. But 
did that handful really represent all of that or make all of this? With Leverenz, 
it is a temptation to say yes, because of the slick correspondence with mythic 
Freudian patterns which he is able to make. Bur it is probably better to sayan 
emphatic no, because we can't know, we can only guess. Leverenz too is only 
guessing! 
Leverenz' mind is one that one must admire: immensely wide reading, a 
sweeping eye, a lively style, fresh examples, and acutely fine comments on the 
literary styles of "diverse fathers" like Thomas Hooker, John Cotton, Thomas 
Shepard, and" divergent sons" like Increase Mather and Samuel Willard. But 
Leverenz' book is one that one must simply forgive. It is a frivolous experiment. 
KARL KELLER 
San Diego State University 
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Home as Found: Authority and Genealogy in Nineteenth-Century American 
Literature by Eric I. Sundquist. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1979. Pp. xxi + 209. $U.OO. 
In clUs study of Cooper, Thoreau, Hawthorne, and 1\1elville, Eric Sundquist 
examines a preoccupation of nineteenth-century American literature TIhar has 
already received a good deal of attention: the conflict between originality and 
imitation, between revolutionary rejections of the past and appeals or capitu-
lations to its authority. But while the approach of such "classic" predecessors 
as F. O. Matthiessen and Marius Bewley was at heart sodal or political, Sundquist 
understands originality and imitation first of all in psychoanalytic terms. " The 
model for the conflicts under examination," he writes, "is the sacrificial totem 
meal Freud finds so strikingly fused with the Oedipal situation," in which" ritual 
remembrance of the [Oedipal] crime unnervingly augments the slain father's 
power at the same time it celebrates the seizure of that power" (xvii, xiii). 
This is not to say that Sundquist is narrowly or exclusively concerned with 
psychology. The totem meal, and Me ambivalence Freud found in it, are 
for him paradigmatic of a whole series of congruent tensions, ranging from 
matters of political authority to questions of authorial legitimacy. In Cooper's 
Home as Found, for instance, the attempt" to found an American home by 
incest and repetition" (36) is related both to Cooper's politics and to the 
function of imitation and parody in his writing. Thoreau's Week is read 
as a paradoxical and self-contradictory U retreat away from the speculative web 
of reference and inference" (54) spun by consciousness and language. In 
Hawthorne Sundquist finds a primal" sacrifice of mimesis," forcing such worles as 
The Scarlet Letter and The House of the Seven Gables to become U head-on 
confrontations with the problem of representation" (122, 126). And Melville's 
Pierre enacts" a point of crisis figuring authority at an impotent crossroads where 
tJhe struggle [between rebellion and capitulation] is so internalized that it can 
generate only a wild, self-reflexive parody" (146). These brief summaries can 
hardly do justice to the dense (sometimes overly dense) complexity of Sundquist's 
argument. But they may at least suggest that his psychoanalytic focus does not 
prevent him from exploring such "literary" questions as the function of 
parody and, in Hawthorne's case, the elusive definition of "romance." 
Sundquist insists that :his use of Freud is not" clinical" but" cultural." He dis-
claims any desire to reduce creative power to neurotic symptom; he uses Freud, 
he says, not to explain but to define "the scenes of crisis that compel some of 
the best American literature of the nineteentlh century" (xvii). While tIus 
approach may offend the strict Freudian it will probably please those who find 
psychoanalytic criticism reductive. But even the non-Freudian may find 
Sundquist's disclaimer an evasion, and find its results unsettling. This" cultural " 
Freudianism leaves important theoretical questions unanswered. The asserted 
relationship of Freud to the texts under discussion is mainly analogical: we are 
told, for instance, that a statement of Freud "corresponds closely" (100) to a 
belief of Hawthorne; that while" original sin" may not be the" primal scene," 
nevertheless U the two equally hypothetical moments have a similar force" 
(103); or simply that there is a "weird coincidence" (104) between an aspect of 
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Hawthorne and an idea of Freud. What is missing here is an asserted explan-
ation of such "coincidences." Ai; a result Sundquist's "cultural" Freudianism 
tends to come unmoored from any precisely defined sense of actual cultural 
interaction. The" coincidence" or "similarity" linking Freud to the works 
under discussion often seems litde more than an elaborate pun. This charge might 
not bother an author who can describe Pierre, for instance, as "a 'Pierrody' and 
'Pierricide' of itself" (184). But onc expects more solid grounding from a book 
which appeals to Freud as "cultural historian" (xvii). 
Nevertheless, whatever one's theoretical reservations about it might be, 
Sundquist's psychoanalytic approach has real practical value. His use of Freud's 
totem meal as analogical model yields an insight into the theme of rebellion and 
authority unavailable in more traditional, "political" approaches to the subject. 
In the work of critics like l\1atthiessen and Bewley the antagonism between 
rebellion and tradition is a contest, however internalized by specific oharacters, 
between separate forces or ideologies. What Freud contributes to Sundquist's 
understanding of this contest is not only the notion of ambivalence but the idea 
that "devotion and rebellion" may be welded "inextricably together" (xi) 
in the same gesture, including the gesture of the author's GWU literary performance. 
This insight permits us to see a crucial connection between the theme and form 
of the works under discussion. The literary analogue to the totem meal is 
parody; "imitation," as Sundquist puts it, "must always entertain the eventuality 
that it be taken as both obedience and mockery" (171-72) of the object it 
burlesques. 
Thus in Cooper's H O17le as F oUl1d the Effinghams' effort to assert legitimacy 
by " echoing and plagiarizing" the past" at once constitutes an inviolable authority 
and threatens to collapse into itself" (39); and Cooper's analogous eifort, as 
son and author, leads him" to the point of self-parody" (25). Thoreau's attempt 
in the Week to write" the myth of America" is simultaneously a "commemor-
ative act" and a parodic repetition of what it seeks to strip away-an imitative 
"commerical intrusion in which the white man's 'load of thought' further 
buries that whioh it would recover" (81). Hawthorne's "Eden" of pure 
mimesis "constantly collapses under the pressure of [that] perception" (110) 
which, in seeking to revive it, only imitates its original loss. In such a view, the 
tradition of nineteenth-century American literature quite naturally culminates 
in the" wild, seLf-reflexive parody" (146) of Pierre, whose hero is "at home" 
only in vhe role and the words of his patriarchal past. 
Some readers will object to Sundquist'S psychoanalytic approach, either 
because they find it too strict or because they find it, theoretically, too loose. 
Some may be put off, and not without reason, by the arch density of his prose. 
Yet his book is still an original and useful contribution, particularly to our 
understanding of the stylistic and fonnal consequences of the obsession with 
autJhority in the literature of the American Renaissance. 
MICHAEL D AVITI BELL 
Williams Colllege 
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The Creation of Nikolai Gogol by Donald Fanger. Cambridge, Mass. and London, 
England: The Bellmap Press of Harvard University Press, 1979. Pp. xviii + 
300. $16.50. 
It is fitting that Donald Fanger's outstanding study on Gogol bear a punning 
title in the spirit of its whimsical object of study. "Creation" here can of course 
be understood: as one possible translation of the standard Russian title for 
monographs on authors, i.e. "tvorcestvo" (works). Of more concern to 
Fanger is the second reading of "creation» in the sense of a verbal noun, the 
process of Gogol's creation of himself, or as Fanger terms it, "Gogol's stey-by-
step self-improvisation as a writer" (ix). Again in Gogolian spirit, Fanger's 
thesis-and this is very much a work of thesis, not synthesis-might be couched 
in the follo"\ving paradox: Gogol attempted uhrough his creativity to fill a vacuum 
with .a void and thereby fill the latter. The" vacuum)) in this paradox is the 
absence of a Russian prose tradition when Gogol began writing in the late 
1820's; :tJhe "void,'" the absence of the usual author's biography which Gogol, in 
person as elusive as in his teALs, took great pains to obscure. In Gogol's 
case the separation of author from text is no modenl critical posture; Fanger's 
well-taken point is that we really have no Gogol other than his texts. And 
the texts point nowhere but to themselves, an assortment of elusive narrators, 
voices, denials and characters that prove upon examination to be "bare verbal 
tissue" (259). As Fanger sums up the problem of text and referrent in Gogol: 
"This ultimate paradox of literary art is Gogol's fundamental message. The 
rest is implication-and of the most various sorts: Psychological, social, ethical, 
religious-all encoded, demonstrably and at the same time incompletely, in 
the texts" (259). These latter incidentally have provided the basis for 
traditional approaches to Gogol from Belinsky to the present day. 
In focusing on the literary problems confronting Gogol, Fanger provides 
a much needed reminder of Gogol's acute awareness of the literary scene of 
his time and of the special role he felt it was destiny to play in Russian Literature. 
Briefly stated, Gogol saw his role to be' for Russian prose what Pushkin was for 
Russian poetry. Fanger emphatically agrees that Gogol's was the first aUbhentic 
national voice in prose; he "broke the language barrier" (235), as Sinyavsky puts 
it, and created Russian prose out of nhe spoken language(s) of his day. This 
parallelism between Pushkin and Gogol Fanger sees culminating in each author's 
greatest works, Eugene One gin, Pushlcin's novel in verse, and Dead Souls, Gogol's 
prose poem4. Both are sustained acts of poetic discourse, compendia of obser-
vation, commentary, confession, imagination with tones varying from burlesque 
through the lyrical to the solemn, with primacy of author as creator (151-2). 
As mentioned, Fanger's study is one of thesis, and therein the reader must 
be cautioned. Although tJhe book is intended for specialists and non-specialists 
alike, one "\vill not find extensive retrac1dng of familiar Gogolian landscape such as 
posb/ost, skaz, "nosology," realized metaphor, hyperbole and like. Fanger 
assumes close familiarity with the texts, the major critics on Gogol and the 
general outlines of the development of Russian Literature. Gogol's works are 
analyzed only to the extent dictated by the thesis. Particularly refreshing is 
Fanger's acceptance of the miracle and mystery of Gogol's achievement. His 
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frank admission of the illfficulties and dangers of interpreting Gogol is also bound 
to be heartening for student<:> of Gogol. But for a srudy whose thesis is that 
content is in the form (235) or as stated in another place, "the bedrock allegory 
of Gogol's art ... concerns the miracle and meaning of its own existence" (261), 
there is a curious absence of extensive discussion about Gogol's ultimate miracle, 
his language. 
Fanger's study abounds in wonderful insights into many of Gogol's works, 
which will provide great stimulus to further study. But the one immediate, 
immense benefit of Fanger's approach is that it does wmat no "committed" 
approach can, simply make possible a reading of Gogol; that is, it not only 
makes permissible an eclectic approach to the works, it virtually insists upon it. 
The responsibility for the reader is to explore all the encoded implications (social, 
psychological or otherwise) of a Gogol text. As he concludes in his remarks on 
"The Overcoat," this sort of analysis entails" a respect for the idiosyncracy of 
the form that allows full appreciation of the capaciousness of Gogol's story, its 
legitimate transcendence of singleness of message ... " (161). 
FRANK J. CoRLISS, JR. 
Wayne State University 
Enlarging the Temple: New Directions in American Poetry During the 1960s 
by Charles Altieri. Lewisburg: Buclmell University Press and London: 
Associated University Presses, 1979. Pp. 258. $17.50. 
Current studies of contemporary American poetry locate their subject some-
where within a historical continuum that extends-so elastic has the tenn H con-
temporary" become-from the end of World War II to the present moment. 
Given '(;he variousness. the sheer breadth, of tJhe work done in poetry during 
these three and a half decades, it is not surprising that we should find 
rather different versions of what constitutes it, depending on where the critic 
cuts into the period or simply on what writers he chooses to deal wiuh. Under-
standably, there have been few attempts to account for everything. Most 
critics forego extensive coverage in order to focus on themes, issues. or 
coherent groupings of writers. Yet few confront the problem of literary change 
in terms ouber than the stylistic and the rhetorical, and few look beyond a 
merely temporal understanding of what is H contemporary" about poetry during 
"his long (and lengcl1ening) period. 
What is immediately striking about Charles Altieri's important book, then, 
particularly at a time when the whole notion of periodization is being called into 
question, is '(;he fact that it focuses on the poetry of a single decade, that of the 
1960s, and views it as a coherent, historical whole. One obvious advantage of 
this approach is that it allows Altieri to avoid some of the risks inherent in 
any criticism of contemporary literature-primarily the risk of attempting to 
evaluate the careers of writers still actively productive. More important, it 
frees him to regard the poetry as a distinct and separate historical achievement, 
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without necessary connection to its continuities with work beyond the decade. In 
tlhis sense, the poetry of the sixties is not contemporary for Altieri; it is com-
prised instead of a relatively fixed body of strategies, values, and styles that are 
seen as having arisen out of particular historical needs and that have now 
been absorbed into the general repertoire of literary models available to still 
newer writers. The great value of the book lies in its rigorously theoretical and 
philosophical definition of those historical needs and its precise placement of 
them in the larger context of literary and philosophical ohange extending back 
through modernism to the Romantics. 
Altieri's term for the period is "postmodern," which in his usage is not simply 
a voguish replacement for contemporary or a gesture in the direction of 
Derridean "free play," but a sharply specific way of referring to the struggles of 
poets in the sixties to surpass the assumptions and values of some of the most 
powerful poetry of the twentieth century, thot of the generation of Yeats anel 
Elliot. What motivated this Wldertaking, moreover, was not just an anxiety 
of influence but a recognition of the need for new models of the poem at a 
time when poets were growing increasingly suspicious of the prophetic claims 
of the symbolist tradition and of the academic formalism, fostered by New 
Criticism, that represented a diluted, if elegant, continuation of that tradition. 
In Altieri's view, poets in the sixties, precisely because of their historical cir-
cumstances, as well as their sense of the inadequacy of forms and values inherited 
from modernism :to newer versions of experience, were forced to reinterpret 
modernist positions on a variety of issues-including the relationship of concrete 
particulars to universals, the role of the se1f in the poetic process, language, mytft, 
anjd the social ·functions of poetry. They had to invent, in short, a ~'coherent 
philosophical poetics" of their own to accommodate axiological and epistemo-
logical orientations beyond the scope of modernism. The chief result was what 
he calls an U aesthetic of presence," or immanence, involving the conviction, 
traced back to 'the early Wordsworth, that "experience has value without the 
artist intervening to rearrange and structure it." & the basic tenet of Altieri's 
version of postmodernism, this aesthetic of presence is opposed to Coleridgean 
symbolist theories that give primacy to the creative role of consciousness or mind 
as the source of value in an and that stand behind modernist poetics. Thus the 
task of the poet is no longer to impose himself on experience and wrest meaning 
from it, transforming it into myth with universal human implications, but to 
open himself to the values and energies already immanent in nature or experience 
and disclose them through the verbal energies of the poem. 
Altieri's argument, even in this bare, oversimplified sketch of it, seems to 
rest on tw"o essential and related claims. One is that me change from symbolist to 
immanentist modes of poetic thought constitutes a historical pattern or context 
inI which a fairly diverse group of poets can be accurately located, and 
the other is that the poets themselves have indeed worked out, no matter how 
consciously or systematically, a coherent poetics of their own as an alternative 
to modernism. This second claim is apparently complicated by the fact 
that some of the poets he deals with-Charles Olson, Robert Duncan, and 
Denise Levertov, for example-have addressed themselves to poetic theory in 
substantial ways, while some of the others-Robert Lowell, W. S. Merwin, Frank 
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aHara-have been comparatively silent about theory or even hostile to it. But 
this complication is quickly disposed of by Altieri's basic assumption as a critic-
that literary style itself necessarily has philosophical implications-while his close 
readings of texts in the light of this assumption demonstrate the extent to which 
poems themselves are often the best manifestation of their underlying poetics. 
In fact, one of the best sections in the book, on the poetry of O'Hara, suggests 
(especially if it is compared with the rather more densely abstract discussions of 
Olson and Duncan) that the absence of explicit theory from a poet's work is 
not necessarily a deprivation for the critic seeking the most direct apprehension 
of his poetry. 
In dealing with his first claim, Altieri offers, in an ambitious and suggestive first 
chapter, "a logical geography mapping the internal relationships among various 
postmodern positions on the nature of the poetic imagination, the rela,tionship 
between the mind and nature or objects, and 1;he ways poetry can deal with 
mythic, historical, and social themes in order to dramatize the importance of 
values radically different from the essential conservatism of the modernists." 
Starting ~th Coleridge and Wordsworth, who provide the fundamental models 
of thought informing modernism and postmodernism respectively, Altieri's 
intention here is to develop the range of differences that distinguish poets 
who .stress the creativity of mind from those who emphasize natural law as a crea-
tive source, as in Robert Duncan's well-known distinction between "the order 
man may contrive or impose upon the things about him" and "the divine order 
or natural order he may discover in them." The rest of the book, five extended 
chapters, is devoted to showing the variety of forms assumed by the basic atti-
tudes of postmodernism in the careers of individual poets, including nhe specifically 
poetic forms and styles to which these attitudes lead. The following poets or 
groups of poets are dealt ~th: ~obert Lowell; Robert Bly, Charles Olson, 
and Frank O'Hara; Gary Snyder and Robert Duncan; Robert Creeley and W. S. 
Merwin; and Denise Levertov. As a version of the poetry of the sixties, this 
selection ~ll not satisfy everyone, biased as it is toward poets associated with 
Black Mountain or Donald Allen's anthology, Tbe New American Poetry. In 
its defense, one might say that Altieri, who is largely indifferent to schools and 
labels, is not merely writing about poets he admires; in each case, his choice 
is more or less dictated by the demands of his "logical geography," his theoretical 
map of the period. One might also say that any theoretical construct that 
provides terms in which both Robert Lowell and Charles Olson can be dis-
cussed as inhabitants of the same literary time and place has much to recommend 
it. In certain ways, in fact, Lowell and Olson, despite the incompatibility of the 
I' schools" to which they are usually assigned-confessional and projectivist-
emerge for A}tieri as the two major figures of the age-Lowell as the greatest 
poet and Olson as the most important theorist. 
Lowell is considered first because he best exemplifies both the need to escape 
modernism and the difficulty of doing so. His break, in Life Studies, from the 
New Critical formalism of his OVlIl earlier ,vork helps to explain the limits of 
that style and dramatizes the need for a new mode that will be more in touch 
with the direct experience of a naturalistic "prose world," a world in which 
experience is conceived as process and in which value is immanent, not transcen-
290 BOOK REVIEWS 
dent. Thus Lowell's poetry shifts radically from the tightly structured, epiphanic, 
densely symbolic forms of LO'rd Weary's Castle to the looser, more open forms 
of his later books which" appear," Altieri shrewdly observes, "to remain faithful 
to the casual flux of experience." Wha.t Lowell's career demonstrates is not only 
an increasing commitment to an aesthetic of presence but a pa.ttern of conversion 
that is exemplary for the sixties, involving a movement away from the universal~ 
izing, myth-maldng, form-giving imagination to a position more immediately 
and directly in the world, so that familiar realities can be, recovered as valuable 
in themselves, not as elements in a symbolic order whose value depends on their 
incamational force. Yet Lowell is ultimately a tragic figure for Altieri because 
his commitment to immanence or flux is incomplete and always attended by a 
sense of loss. Although his later work is based on the conviction that we 
are "only in touch with what we touch," Lowell cannot give up what he 
nonetheless no longer trusts without nostalgia, a kind of Arnoldian longing 
for discredited historical and cultural ideals that arouses, Altieri claims, the 
suspicions of younger contemporaries who are less ambiguously disenchanted with 
history. But one wonders if Lowell is SD completely isolated and without influence 
as tlhis accDunt, moving as it is, sugge~. Or is this simply a minor mstance of 
Altieri's "logical geDgraphy" leading him to overstate his case, and thus to 
expDse the extent to which .that geDgraphy is a versiDn 'Of literary history whose 
explanatory power depends as much on what it excludes (those poets, for 
example, who value Lowell's wDrk) as on what it I!eveals (the paths pursued by 
other poets cDnsciously attempting a more complete break with humanist values)? 
What is most imponant in this discussion, in any case, is Altieri's insistence that 
for -all the appearance of casualness and contingency in Lowell's poetry, it is 
in fact in me process of discovering or appropriating conventions whereby it con-
.tinues to generate interpretative patterns or structures that make possible the 
emergence of generalized perspectives on experience. This is especially true in 
Life Studies, where concrete images or incidents in individual poems acquire 
larger significance as they are absorbed into patterns in the volume as a whole. 
Thus, as a theorist of a poetics of immanence or presence, Altieri stops shon 
of ]. Hillis Miller's position in Poets of Reality, where, in advancing a similar 
poetics, Miller claims that a poet like Williams achieves an unmediated appre-
hension of the world, the poem as cl1e thing itself. In the aesthetic of pr-esence, 
Altieri points out, "poems do not present direct experience but the aesthetic 
illusion of direct experience that depends on style and form as means for 
seeing the world freshly." 
AU the poets Altieri examines after his -treatment of Lowell .represent a 
variety of positions and attitudes within the full context of the aesthetic- of 
presence. The work of Bly, Olson, and O'Hara offers three distinct but related 
ways of moving beyond Lowell's despairing nostalgia for humanism, based on the 
idea that U the moment immediately and intensely experienced can restore one to 
harmony with the world and provide ethical and psychological renewal." 
Then Snyder and Duncan are presented as essentially religious poets with few 
doubts about their faith in the satisfactions to be derived from the fullnesS 
of ongoing experience, or "process as plenitude." It is precisely this faith 
that Creeley and Merwin, however, cannot summon, aDld they serve Altieri 
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as instances of a more skeptical and ironic attitude to\",ard the immanentist imper-
ative, "be here intensely." This attitude, moreover, is based on a radical aware-
ness of the inadequacy of experiences of presence that arc simply not abiding or 
that do not somehow take account of their opposite, experiences of absence. 
On the whole, these chapters constitute the best criticism of these pacts th:lt 
we have had. Altieri is able to place them within his historical and theoretical 
context and provide richly detailed accounts of their work, :1.I1d one must be 
grateful for the tremendous sense hc has been able to makc of a period that 
up to now has oftcn seemed to be dizzyingly varied, a welter of styles, fmllls, 
schools, and attitudes with little if anything in common. Despite this, he seems 
to me to be less than entirely successful in his sections on Olson and Duncan, 
in the sense that his discussions of their work sometimes exhibit nearh" the 
same degree of difficulty that their work itself docs, and so readers wh~ find 
these poets turgidly involuted or esoterically involved with their own 
private visions may not be encouraged to persist with them by Altieri's cor-
responding density. In the section on Olson in particular, I found myself wishing 
for less theory and for a greater focus on poetry, especially gi\"en the extent 
to which, as Altieri shows, Olson's value as a writer lies in his conscious efforts 
to extend the boundaries of the lyric and to push toward the epic-a push 
demanded by all the implications of his thought. The one poem by Olson 
discmised, "Variations Done for Gerald Van de Wiele," is dealt ·with be:!utifully, 
but as Altieri himself admits, it is "essentially a pa<;toral poel11 in the Romanric 
meditative mode," and as such it cannot exemplify the fullest reach of Olson's 
thinking as it emerges in the discussion, In fact, Altieri's almost exclusiye 
orientation toward the lyric may be a limitation, since one imagines that 
attention to larger forms, particularly in the work of a poet like Obon, might 
have necessitated some qualification of the claims made for the aesthetic of 
presence as a definiti,"e concept for the period. The lyric, after ail, has 
traditionally been the most fundamental form in which to address a present 
moment of intense experience, and Olson clearly grew impatient with 
conyentional notions of lyricism, or at least with ·",hat he regarded as its inherent 
subjective interference with the perceptual act. For these reasons, despite 
the degree to which most modern poems approximating epic sh~' awa~' from 
narrative, one wonders how far an aesthetic of presence can support an epic 
ambition-a poem, as Pound defined it, including history. On the other hand, 
it seems egu:!lly clear that Olson's Afa:eimus, whose posnllodernislll might hest he 
defined by the way it includes not history per se bur its 0\\11 histor~', continlles 
itself to he governed largely by lyric procedures, Olson's redefinition of sllch 
procedures notwithstanding, 
On the general issue of limit:1tions-not of the poets but of the aesrheric of 
presence itsclf-Altieri provides a final chapter, and it is the most prohkm.1ric 
of the book. He de:!ls here with Denise Le,-enm'. but his interest is less in h<:r 
,\-ork, which he sees as a hirly st:md:1rd ,'crsian of il1l1ll:Hlentist poeTry. dun in 
her discO\'er~' of the inappropri:!teness of her poetics to the cthic:l1 :1nd puhlic 
themes oCC:1.sioncd by rhe YiCtl1:1111 \\·ar. In pursuing this interesT. :\lrieri 
deyi:ltes sh:trply from the structure of his e:1r]icr ch~lpter.:;:, which :1re :Ill lul.l11ced 
:111.1 dc\'c]opmcnul considerations of the work of one or more pOClS. :md 
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engages new themes in a way that dilutes or at least complicates the thrust of his 
book. His concern now is to raise questions about the philosophical adequacy 
of postmodernism from the perspective of its failures with social and political 
issues, and rus argument, taking a series of jarring twists and turns, leads him 
first to congratulate Levertov for arriving at a crucial awareness of the in-
sufficiency of her immanentist stance-oriented as it is towar.d particular and 
personal experiences of presence-in a time of political turmoil. But she is then 
criticized harshly not only for the poverty of her methods of accommodating 
larger issues but for her failure to avail herself of models and traditions that 
might provide the greater discursiveness and generalizing ability required by a 
style seeking, in Altieri's words, II to formulate an ethic and an aesthetic that might 
help restructure the consciousness of society." The lapses in this phase of 
Levertov's work, as Altieri demonstrates them, are clear, but what seems less 
than fair is the way she is made to bear the brunt of the attack here for problems 
endemic to postInodern poetics in general and thus potentially to most of the 
poets with whom Altiexi deals. 
It is then somewhat ironic that the alternative models and traditions Altieri 
has in mind for Levertov are those of modernism-ironic because so much of the 
book is devoted to showing why poets of the sixties could not accept modernist 
procedures. Yet even though these procedures are capable, as he suggests (with-
out full demonstration), of generating a valuable public poetry, Altieri goes 
on to aclmowledge that "no poetry is likely to have much direct impact 
on the social order." His concern, then, is that poetry not be "embarrassingly 
simplistic," regardless of its political or ethical effectiveness. Its value is 
essentially aesthetic, or that of an act of mind, and even modernism, for all the 
nobility of its efforts to work out a viable relatiom~hip between the poet and 
society, did not and perhaps could not wholly succeed in the public realm. But 
how satisfied, one must ask, would Levertov have been with an appeal to aesthetics 
in the midst of her urgent attempts to end the war? Though Altieri distinguishes 
between poetry and politics as modes of consciousness and action respectively, 
is it not precisely impatience with this kind of dichotomy, and with the 
resulting divorce between thought and action, that prompted the various breaks 
with modernism in the sixties? 
Despite these difficulties of his last chapter-difficulties of tone and sheer 
haste more than actual content-it is a mark of Altieri's originality and energy 
as a critic that he does not simply let the entire matter rest by offering one more 
example of the aesthetic of presence-even one which happens to turn against 
itself critically out of frustration with its inability to engage social and political 
themes. Instead, Levertov's crisis provides him with an opening for a general 
discussion of "the limitations of all modem political poetry" aru:l an opportunity 
to reconsider modernism in the light of its relatively greater achievement in 
this area. Moreover, in concluding with what must be regarded QS a resuscitation 
of modernism in a book otherwise devoted to what repla,ces it historically, 
Altieri suggests that literary history is not simply progressive or developmental 
but, as he puts it in an interesting note, " a kind of differential field in which there 
is no progress, only a series of permutations and oppositions that sustain 
one another." The danger, of course, is that he is throwing his book off balance, 
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as well as undermining its teleological design, by introducing new themes and an 
altered perspective at the very end. One requires a little reminding, after this 
last table-turning chapter, that Altieri's basic argument, after all, concerns the 
success of the poets of the sixties in finding alternatives to modernism. 
ROBERT KERN 
Boston College 
Storytelling and Mythmaking: Images from Film and Lite1'ature by Frank 
McConnell. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979. Pp. :A"Y + 
303. $13.95. 
Frank McConnell's Storytelling and Mythmaking violates the sacred cows of 
many academic cinestes, but those who would be horrified by his methodology 
and his results are unlikely to read this review, much less understand what 
McConnell has to say. McConnell assumes a sophisticated, literate (books and 
films) audience, and plunges amead without shame into an investigation of the 
roots of storytelling common to both literature and film. His book is both 
the presentation of a critical approach and an interpretive application of that 
approach. The title is accurate: he is concerned with the juncture of storytelling 
and mythmaking as they are imagined in film cmd literature. His process is 
synthetic and, quietly, syncretic. 
McConnell is mercifully direct and clear about his critical tastes and premises: 
"This book is about film and literature as kinds of storytelling. It argues that 
stories matter, and matter 'deeply, because they are the best way to save 
our lives." He goes on to say that vicariously playing the hero of stories u •• .is 
still the best version of < self-help' our civilization has invented." Consequently, 
anyone who looks at the title and glances at the first page has a pretty good idea of 
the critical precepts informing what follows. .McConnell then deals with the 
relationships of both film and writing to storytelling. But his task in the first 
few pages is to make the reader aware of his vie'ws on these issues, to make 
clear the premises from which all else will follow. Avoiding the polemical traps 
of so many other writers on film and literature, McConnell explains only what 
the reader needs to know to grapple with the ideas of tbis book. After giving 
the reader enough to grasp 'his critical premises, he sets out on his real chore. 
That chore is a worthwhile one: to reconsider Northrop Frye's notions of the 
relationships between stories and mythic patterns. McConnell summarizes Frye's 
ideas and acknowledges his debts to Frye for illuminating the importance of 
archetypes and the great cycle of stories. McConnell rightly sees his 
reconsideration of Frye's work as " ... more a matter of focus than of field." 
McConnell then examines a central part of Frye's system (one which has always 
bothered me as well): Frye's temporal basis for the cycles of storytelling. In 
Rousseau's Tbe Social Contract lVlcConnell finds a set of principles which solve 
the problems of Frye's system by allowing " ... us to see how the archetypes them-
selves are present, at any given stage of history, within a single phase of civili-
zation." 
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Rousseau pointe; out four types of law (i. e. determinants of the relationships 
of individuals to each other and to the state) which adapt nicely to the 
numerical morphology of archetypal critics: laws establishing order in a 
society; laws setting forth the ways in w:h.iah people relate to eaoh other 
(civil laws); laws defining crimes (and therefore punishments); and finally the 
the "bws" of conscience-what human beings simply know to be right and 
just. McConnell adapts Rousseau's ideas to a four-cycle division of story fonns 
similar to that offered by Frye, with types 9£ laws becoming the archetypal 
foundations of various story forms. The four literary forms arc, predictably 
(I mean that in a positive sense), epic, romance, melodrama, and satire. 
The remainder of the introduction defines the four kinds of stories. The 
epic is a tale of beginnings whose hero, a king, incarnates and imposes a code of 
myth (i. e. political law) on a city (culture) he founds. Thus the hero initiates 
what becomes the normative basis for a society. The romance begins with a 
culture whose primary laws (the guiding principles provided by the king of 
the epic) have already been established. The king tlherefore recedes into the 
background and the figtme of the knight becomes prominent. His mission is to 
make the life of the culture tolerable (rather than to establish any principles) j 
consequently, the knight focuses on training the citizens of the culture to observe 
basic codes of behavior. 
Eventually, however, the culture becomes increasingly corrupt, ushering in a 
new kind of "hero," a descendant of tJhe knight, who tries to restore the culture to 
its original principles; McConnell calls cllis figure the 'I pawn." The hero 
of melodrama moves through a corrupt culture; the city (the culture) is itself 
the problem and no longer the end worth establishing and building as in vhe first 
two movements of the cycle. For McConnell, such a world is best oharacterized 
by the qualities of the detective-a man who is both victim yet somewhat able 
to affect his culture (or at least a segment of it). 
As the hero of melodrama becomes increasingly disenchanted, the cycle moves 
on to satire. The city is a place no longer worth saving, nor can the hero find 
in it the detective's renmants of honor. The satirist is so surrounded by cor-
ruption that he can only look inward to discover truly moral laws and, using 
those laws imbedded in the human heart, attack the corruption of the culture 
in hopes of demolishing and (re) establishing the principles which would begin tJhe 
cycle again. 
The pattern is one which is both convincing and useful, and l\1cConnell moves 
on in the succeeding chapters to show how the pattern illuminates individual texts. 
In doing so, McConnell strains at times to balance his attention to both film 
and literature. Literature obviously offers the most fertile ground for studying 
epic. McConnell casts about for films which have epic concerns, spending time 
on films such as THE SANDS OF IWO JIMA and THE TEN COMMAND-
MENTS (which he aptly dismisses). Finally, The Iliad, tbe Aeneid, and Beowulf 
are examined next to IVAN THE TERRIBLE, INTOLERANCE, and MAN 
OF ARAN. While the three films support McConnell's thesis, they seem woefully 
mismatohed against such literary giants. (I have no better suggestions, however. 
Ours is scarcely an age of epic. One wonders whether the present sense of 
apocalypse will turn full circle to soon produce genuine epics for our culture.) 
j 
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McConnell's ideas become more interesting and more· pressing to me when he 
enters the world of romance. While the knight and the western hero have been 
juxtaposed· before, McConnell's perspective on the juxtaposition is interesting 
and infonnative. And while we may have some difficwty today with notions 
of establishing a culture, we have no difficulty with works presenting the 
tension between chaos and culture, between the heart of darkness and civil-
zarian. McConnell moves easily from traditional literature to contemporary 
film in this section: SiT Gawain, Lancelot, The Song of Roland and St. Paul's 
epistles help illuminate THE PRlSO~ OF ZENDA, RED RIVER, MY 
DARLING CLEMENUNE, and PATrON. 
As we move into the world of melodrama, we keep moving toward a view. of 
society more immediately recognizable. The world of melodrama is the world 
of pawns, a world in which people have increasingly lost their vision of the 
founding principles. In the western., for example, the transformation to melodrama 
can be seen in heroes who attempt to sustain personal ethics in a culture which 
no longer respects the values of the traditional western hero. But McConnell 
suggests that the key figure in melodrama is the detective-the man who works 
along in a morass of corruption, maintaining (albeit cynioally) a personal code of 
honor. Money or matters of property are the central issue for stories in this 
part of the cycle, and the detective is the person who quests for infonnation 
about such issues. While traditional literary works are given front stage in 
me section on epic and middle stage in romance, the balance shifts in the section pn 
melodrama. Films like THE BIG SLEEP, MURDER ON THE ORIENT EX-
PRESS, CITIZEN KANE, THE LAST LAUGH,NORTHBYNORTHWEST, 
LITTLE CAESAR, and THE GODFATHER dominate a consideration which 
also includes Henry James, Joseph Conrad, and Franz Kafka. 
Similarly, cinema dominates the section on satire, although McConnell carefully 
covers traditional bases beginning with Aristotle and moving tlhrough the Greeks, 
Pope, Swift, and Petronius. McConnell discusses the films of the Marx 
brothers, Chaplin, Woody Allen, Fellini, Renoir, as well as such films as ONE 
FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO'S NEST, KING KONG, THE GRADUATE, 
and COOL-HAND LUKE. The distinctions of the basic kinds of satire and 
of the ways satire returns toward epic are especially well handled in this section. 
Appended to the treatment of the four phases of the cycle is the text's 
most problematic section: "Images and Archetypes." McConnell presents a series 
of stills winh one-page glosses. The stills function much like the quotes from 
literary works throughout the book, and I think would have been better placed in 
the text and integrated with the discussions of individual films. Perhaps the 
economics of publishing dictated gathering the pictures in one place; even so, the 
separation drains energy from the development of points key to McCOIlllell's 
central concept. The stills could have been centralized and ties made to them 
at the appropriate places in the author's discourse. 
The problem with integrating the stills points to a larger problem of inte-
gration. The book is a bit too formulaic, Q bit too mechanical, a bit too much like 
a Ph. D. thesis. He lays out a theoretical base in the introduction and then 
illustrates his theory chapter by chapter. His level of insight Qnd his lmowledge 
are clearly mature, yet there remains a sense of very impressive pieces squeezed 
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in as convenient. Control exists primarily over the individual pieces (many of 
which could be excised and many more of which could be added) but not over 
the whole; the writer's knowledge and expression finally seem more mature than 
his sense of structure. 
Two other objections. The text is not always consistent in what it assumes 
of the reader and how it therefore treats the reader. At times I felt I was 
being talked down to, as if the intended reader had a sophomore's sophistication, 
and yet to understand what the author says one must be intimately acquainted 
with a broad range of works of film and literarure. The other objection is to 
the bibliography. Its strangely weak, especially on books about film, given the 
apparent breadth of primary and secondary reading evinced in the book itself. 
I need .to make clear, though, that my reservations are minor. The author 
writes well and clearly (perhaps accounting for the occasional spasm of 
condescension since he must articulate complex matters), and what he has to say 
is interesting, challenging, and worthwhile. I learned a good deal from this 
book, and it is now making rhe rounds of my colleagues. 
California Polytechnic State University, 
San Lui! Obispo 
JOHN HARRINGTON 
